A

DISSERTATION

ON THE

HAPPY INFLUENCES

OF

SOCIETY merely Civil;

In RELATION to the

Improvement and *Ornaments*

OF THE

MIND.

WITH

A *Commonition* touching more eſpecially the revived *Errors* antiently aſcrib'd to EPICURUS, pertaining to this Subject.

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THE PREFACE.



HE Reader *is not to expect in* this Diſſertation *a Piece that is* altogether new to the Publick, *though if it be* new to Him *I think it is much the ſame Thing. A conſiderable Part of it, together with other Arguments, and Conſiderations, taken from the* Sacred Writings, *which were thought proper for the Place and Occaſion, was deliver'd before the* Magiſtrates *and* Citizens *of* LONDON, *upon an* Election *of their* chief Annual Magiſtrate *in the* CHAPPEL OF THE GUILD-HALL.

THE Diſcourſe was publiſh'd, and as I have underſtood, it has not met with an ill Reception. Some Things which I had ſaid before *are* here *ſaid, if I miſtake not,* more accurately *and* clearly; *and thoſe that are* newly added *are ſo offer'd to the* Learned *as not to be unintelligible to the ſerious and diligent* unlearned *Reader. I will add that no various Judgments in Matters of* Religion *can hinder either the* Romaniſt, *the* Reform'd, *the*

Proteſtant, *the exact and zealous* Conformiſt *to the* Church of England, *or the* Diſſenter *of* any Denomination *from reading, or from reliſhing it, if it has any Goodneſs in it,* in its preſent Form.

THIS is more perhaps than ſhould be ſaid of the Performance of a Divine of any Church, *unleſs it were a* Preliminary, *and* firſt diſtinct Advance *to ſomething* more Important. *It is more than I will ſay of* another *Diſſertation I have prepar'd* upon the happy Influences of SOCIETY modell'd by the CHRISTIAN INSTITUTES. *For I will not be ſo bold as to* PRESUPPOSE, *what yet I have* aim'd at *in it, and hop'd in ſome Inſtances may* poſſibly happen, *i. e. a* convincing Men *of ſome Miſtakes they are under in Things pertaining to this Subject.*

IS it an Effect of Vanity *to conceive any ſuch Expectations? I would willingly think it rather a Good-will to my* Countrymen, *my* Friends, *and my* Fellow-Chriſtians, *and the* honeſt Degree of Good Hope, *neceſſary to the raiſing of Endeavors and Action upon ſuch a Diſpoſition, than a* proper *and then certainly a* culpable *Vanity. And the more is the* Pity *if I am miſtaken in thinking ſo, or diſappointed any ways in a* good Aim and Hope.

THE Deſign is, ſo far as my Ability may ſerve, that the Romaniſt *ſhould be pointed to ſome of his Miſtakes, whilſt, amongſt other Things briefly ſuggeſted, the* boaſted Argument, *which has ſo frequently been thrown* againſt our Eſtabliſhment *from that Quarter, is repell'd, and retorted, as by Perſons of greater Abilities it may be with ſtill greater Force, upon the* Aſſailants.

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THE Separatiſt *from our Communion upon Principles which* have their Riſe in POLITICKS, *but a* perverſe Scheme *of them, is* the Man *that will moſt of all peradventure there be met with, if He can be perſwaded (and why ſhould that be thought impoſſible?) to* diveſt, *or in any* tolerable Degree to diſengage *Himſelf from his* unhappy Prejudices.

THE Diſſenter *of any* other *Denomination, if he finds nothing that ſhall affect him with* kinder and juſter Thoughts *towards our Eccleſiaſtical Conſtitution, will meet with nothing, I think, that ſhall* exaſperate *him, or make him ſuſpect what I have offer'd to flow from* Ill-will *or* Hatred *towards Him: Nor will* any Perſons whatever, *I hope, indulge a Suſpicion of that ſort, for which I am ſure they will have no Grounds.*

THE Members of our Eſtabliſh'd Church *will ſee Arguments and Reflections, both general, and* particular ſome of them to the Church of *England, that are agreeable to* generous Principles, *that whilſt they breath a Love of* reaſonable *and* chriſtian *Liberty, are* conſiſtent *with* HER COMMUNION, *with a* great Reſpect *for her* LEARNED CLERGY, *a* ſubmiſſive Reverence *for her* EXCELLENT PRELATES; *and in one Word, but take it rightly, that* * *do Honour* TO HER CONSTITUTION.

THE putting out this Proluſion diſtinctly *will anſwer the Thoughts I have ſometimes had of* Re-printing *the above-mention'd* Sermon *with ſome Additions, a Tranſpa-*

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* *I mean it in the Senſe that Sir* R. S. *publickly us'd and defended the Uſe of the Phraſe.*

ſition

ſition of a few Things to a more commodious place for a better Method and Connexion, and with Omiſſion of the numerous marginal Citations from a late Book *which I oppos'd. It will ſerve alſo to* invite *the Reader, whoever he be, to an* Appetite of the other principal one, *or elſe timely admoniſh him, and put it in his Power with very little Damage, with a* Moiety *only of the Diſtaſte and Grievance his* Delicacy *might have ſuffer'd, to deſiſt, accordingly as he ſhall have a* better *or* worſe *Opinion of the Author's Capacity and Talents, as he ſhall either* like *or* diſlike *his* manner *of treating the Subject he has undertaken in* this View, *and* his Deſign *of treating it in a* more complex View, *and in its* preſent improved State amongſt us.

P. S. *I may now add by a later Date (the Publication of one and* in regular Order firſt *of the two Pieces, having been for ſome Reaſons a little retarded) that this which I have above ſpoken of as* in fieri, *or in a Readineſs to be publiſh'd, is* already *ſubmitted to the View and Judgment of the Publick.*

I could perhaps with leſs Trouble *have been* more copious. *It will be conſider'd, that* not a great deal, *if any Thing, can be ſaid* new *upon this Subject without* Erring *or* Trifling, *which are both* large Fields. *Again, the Force of Arguments may be* collected into a ſmall Compaſs; *and with this View a* Strength *of Style is rather to be aim'd at than a* ſoft and muſical Cadence; *the* moſt expreſſive *Words, that may convey an Idea more determinately, or convey a* greater Number of Ideas *than commoner Words can do, ſhould ſeem the propereſt, this being the neareſt Way of arriving at the End propos'd. If the*

Uſe

Uſe of technical *Words to the* Sons of Art *be not improper, that which will in any Degree juſtify it, will, I think, more eaſily and fully juſtify* ſuch a Style *as I am ſpeaking of. For the former are* abſolutely *unintelligible to Men* unskill'd in the particular Art *which is the Subject of them, whereas I perſwade my ſelf, I have us'd* no Terms or Phraſes, *but what Men of* general *Learning, though not particularly nor much vers'd in the Schools either of* Theology *or of* Political Science, *will readily underſtand, and that even they who have not the Advantages of Learning may moſtly make out the Senſe of, if they think it worth their while, by repeated Reading and by Dint of Thought. None but Men of* Thought and Serioufneſs *are convinc'd and mov'd* at all *by Argument in ſuch Matters; and to* theſe *it is often ſufficient only to* point out *Things of principal Moment, and ſet them at Work by a few proper and leading* Hints: *For it may be ſuppos'd, or at leaſt it ſeems moſt probable, that they who will not be at the Pains to* carry on *ſuch Hints, and to* make the natural Deductions *from them, would ſcarcely have been at the Pains to* examine and judge carefully, *had the particular Deductions been* made to their Hands, *whether they were* rightly *made or* not.

BREVITY may have its Uſe, yet like other Things which have their Conveniencies, it may have its Inconvenience *too attending it; and ſtrange as it may ſeem, yet ſometimes ſo it happens, that a* Laconic Frugality of Words *may be the Parent, or at leaſt prove the Occaſion, of* ſo liberal a Profuſion *of them, as may on the other Hand run the Hazard of being cenſur'd for an* Aſiatic Prodigality. Manum ergo de tabulâ—*For may it not be ſaid of a* long

The PREFACE.

* Preamble *with as good Reaſon as it was ſaid by the* old Philoſopher *of a* Great Book, *that it is* ΜΕΓΑ ΚΑΚΟΝ.

IF I had not judg'd it neceſſary to ſay ſomething concerning the Tranſmutation *of a* Sermon *into a* Diſſertation, *this Prologue might perhaps have been entirely omitted. However I can't have* offended, *I think, in the* Bulk *of the* Book, *if both the Diſſertations ſhould be put together, or very much in the* Length *of the* Preface, *which, ſince it was determin'd on, it ſeem'd but natural ſo to model, and ſo far to amplify it, as that it* might ſerve for both *of them. For the reſt, I have only to wiſh* my Reader *to put the* kindeſt Conſtruction *upon what he meets with, to make his* beſt Uſe *of it, and* FAREWEL.

ROBERT BURROW.

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*..Ἐυνόοις ἔιγε μεν ταῦτα ὥς χ̓ φίλοις, πκροῖς ἐδ̓ὲ πολλά—

ERRAT.

Page 24. laſt Word, read *Propoſitions.*

A DIS-

A

DISSERTATION

ON

Society merely Civil, &c.

MAN is a Creature naturally inclin'd to and deſirous of SOCIETY with others of his *Species*. His *Wants*, his *Fears*, his *Hopes* direct and urge him to the SOCIAL AND CIVIL LIFE; which, being ſo agreeable to Reaſon, and moſt evidently a Mean of many great Advantages to Men, might from thence alone have been preſum'd, together with *Government* and every thing that is neceſſary thereto, to be agreeable to the Will of GOD.

AND wiſe Men, who had not the Benefit of *Chriſtian Revelation*, have aſſur'd themſelves, that *ſocial Life* and *publick Power* were inſtituted and ordain'd by GOD for the great *Good* and *Happineſs* of Mankind in *manifold* and *numerous* Reſpects.

WHEN TULLY aſcribes ſo much Glory to *Philoſophy* in that noted Paſſage of the 5th *Tuſcul. O Vitæ Philoſophia*

loſophia dux, &c. the Particulars he touches upon make it evident his Eye was principally, I may almoſt ſay entirely fix'd upon this *Poliſhing* of Men and *improving their Manners by ſocial Life*; and in another place,* where alſo he takes particular and principal Notice of the happy Effect Philoſophy has upon *human Society*, he acknowledges with *Plato*, that it is the *Gift* or the *Invention of the Gods*.

ARISTOTLE ſays, † that *what is of uſe to whole Communities is moſt excellent and divine* — That *Civil Science aims at* (he therefore without queſtion thought that well regulated it was capable of effecting) *Mens moſt extenſive and chiefeſt Good* — ὥϛε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν and in another Place || he intimates, that there are *many Particulars in the Happineſs which reſults from political Fellowſhip* — ὥϛε δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ τῆϛ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆϛ τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ.

Now as I have obſerv'd, ſuch of the *many Particulars*, and thoſe *happieſt* Influences of *Society merely Civil*, which relate to the *Improvement*, *Ornament*, and *Comfort* of Men's MINDS, to have been commonly acknowledg'd *only incidentally*, and aſſerted rather as it were *en paſſant*, than profeſſedly treated of, I have judg'd it might be of good Uſe to conſider this Point *ſingly* and *diſtinctly*; and to give the proper Cautions againſt Errors that relate hereto in *different Extremes*. By which preliminary Step I ſhall clear the Way to *more home and intimate* Speculations upon the Subject

* Tuſcul. 1. p. 55. † Ethic. Nicom. Lib. 1, c. 2.
|| Ibid. Lib. 5. c. 1.

of

of *ſocial Life* ſtill, but in a more *complex and extended View*.

SOME have in their very refin'd Speculations too rigidly confin'd the Effects and Benefits of *Civil Society* only to the *Body* and what relates to it, to *external and bodily Things*, excluding all manner of Influences from hence to the *promoting of Virtue*, which they groundleſsly conceive to be of ſuch a delicate Nature, as that, inſtead of being excited and cheriſh'd, it periſhes, the whole Nature of it is deſtroy'd, as ſoon as any *Rewards* and *Encouragements* are publickly propos'd or given to it, and any the leaſt *Regard* had, though in Co-operation with other and more powerful Principles, to thoſe ſuppos'd improper and miſchievous Motives.

AGAIN ſome, in giving their Accounts of *Civil Society*, and of *Man* the Subject of it, have deſcrib'd him in a moſt contemptible manner, and made the moſt wretched Figure imaginable of him whilſt *Unciviliz'd*, and yet have been very earneſt at the ſame time to make it appear, if they could, that He is no otherwiſe capable of being *Civiliz'd*, than by means of being *deluded and impos'd upon*.

SINGLE *and Unciviliz'd* He can, according to their Scheme, diſcern no *Difference* in Things, no *Diſtinction* betwixt *Good and Evil*; when *Civiliz'd*, he is ſhew'd indeed a *Difference* of *Virtue* and *Vice*, but no other than what the *cunning Politician has arbitrarily* coin'd; who *fraudulently* induces the Members of *Society* to practiſe ſuch Things as are neceſſary to their living together with any Comfort or Decency upon *falſe* Motives of his own Fiction. Of himſelf he has

no manner of Regard or Love for his *Species*: He neither has, nor pretends, ſay they, any other View and Aim than the gratifying of his own Appetites; and if he is perſuaded to enter into *ſocial Life*, then all the Difference and the Advantage is, that he ſhall *pretend* to have, and perhaps be made himſelf to believe that he has, a Love for Mankind, and abundance of other good Qualities, which he is a perfect Stranger to. The *cunning Law-givers*, and whoever have labour'd for the Eſtabliſhment of *Society*, ſhall impoſe upon him extravagant and vain Notions of the *Dignity of his Nature*; they will indeed excite him often to Actions uſeful to the *Publick*, wherein he ſhall deny his own *Inclinations* and *Appetites*, but they have no other way to do it, but by *flattering* and *deceiving* him; they muſt work him up to it by propoſing *fictitious imaginary* Rewards and Motives, becauſe, ſay they, there are no *real* ones to be an *equivalent* for ſuch *Self-denial* as always attends generous Actions.

THESE are Rocks, the *latter* more eſpecially, which it is of no ſmall Importance that Men ſhould ſometimes be caution'd to avoid; neither ſhall I lead my Reader into a *dark and unprofitable Controverſy*, whilſt I offer ſome Things in Oppoſition to and caution againſt ſuch Notions.

SOME may think, eſpecially they who do not much concern themſelves with Variety of Books and Opinions of Mankind, that it is very unneceſſary for any one to be *polemical*, and give himſelf the Trouble of *diſputing upon theſe Subjects*, and that to be *victorious* here would be of very little *Uſe* or *Merit*. I ſhould be content and glad that *all the World* would think ſo,

and

and that with ſome others I have been fighting with a Shadow and a Phantom. It ought to be more Satisfaction to one to think he has been under a *Deluſion*, a *Fit of Quixotiſm*, or *in a Dream*, whilſt he *imagin'd* pernicious Notions to be receiv'd and ſent abroad, than to have had the Praiſe of engaging chearfully and behaving as one ought to do in a *neceſſary War* of ſuch a Sort; and eſpecially if the Things which the Argument, ſuppoſing there is an Adverſary, requires to be ſaid, be of ſuch a Nature as might *uſefully* be ſaid *without reſpect to any Controverſy*, if they be ſuch as are apt and proper happily to influence Mens Tempers and Practices, to make them good *Citizens*, good *Subjects*, good *Magiſtrates*, and *in every reſpect good Men*.

Now whilſt it is ſhewn, that *Civil Society* has very happy and beneficial Influences on Mens *Minds*, in improving their Manners and Virtue, as well as good Effects in regard to *external* Things, and that the Laws of Society, though they may excite to and encourage *moral Virtue*, yet are by no means the *arbitrary Makers* thereof, nor the *Source* and *Origin* to which it is ſolely or ultimately to be referr'd, whilſt theſe Things, I ſay, are made appear, the *Law-givers*, the *Civilizers of Mankind*, *Society* and *human Nature* it ſelf are all vindicated indeed from a calumnious and odious Charge againſt them, as if they had *no real Foundation* to go upon in exciting Men to brave and generous and friendly Offices. But to thoſe, who think there is no need of ſuch a Vindication, I have this further to ſay, *viz.* That the ſame Arguments are likewiſe calculated and apt to inſpire *Courage*, *Diligence*, *Activity*, and every other requiſite Quality into thoſe who have

conſiderable

conſiderable Parts in the Adminiſtration of publick Power, when they ſee and conſider of how great Importance it is to the reſpective Bodies in which they *bear Office*, that it be well and faithfully executed; and alſo to induce private Perſons duly to value and prize that *Authority* to which they are ſubject, through means of which they may obtain theſe Benefits; to induce *all* Perſons, of whatever Degree and Station in the Capacity of Subjects, to yield a ſteady and chearful Obedience and Submiſſion above all to the KING AS SUPREME, and in every Capacity to *love and practice* VIRTUE, which is not only improv'd and rewarded by *Society*, but is ſeen alſo to be the *invariable Law of our Nature* by the *Will of* GOD, whom we *imitate* in *being* and in *doing Good*.

THE Benefit of *Civil Government* is plainly diſcernible herein, and it is without Diſpute a principal End for which *Laws* are made, and *Magiſtrates* appointed, that Men, who will not be perſuaded, or are not of themſelves diſpos'd to regulate their Paſſions by Reaſon, ſhall be hinder'd by *Terror and Force* from ſatisfying their extravagant Paſſions in *defrauding*, in *oppreſſing*, and *tearing to Pieces*, all that ſhould be unable to reſiſt them.

WE never did *experience* indeed the Dangers, the Oppreſſions, and Miſeries, that belong to *Anarchy* and *unſocial* Life, where no Man has greater Security and Defence than what he can *make for himſelf*; and we have hardly any *Accounts* perhaps of Things tranſacted by Men *perfectly* in ſuch a State. But we know enough to be ſenſible what would inevitably happen in ſuch a State; we know what *Steps and Approaches* Men, once combin'd

combin'd into regular Societies, have made to ſuch a Scene of Wretchedneſs, as our Imagination rightly applies to *unſocial Life*.

HISTORY, I ſay, if not Experience, will eaſily inform Men of the *unhappy Approaches*, Communities, whether whole Nations, or particular Cities, have made to ſuch a State; and we ſhall find, that it has been *in the very Proportion* that their *Society* was ill and weakly connected, in the Degrees and Proportion that their *Laws* were *defective*, and the Hands of their *Governors* weaken'd by any *Impediment* whatever, occaſion'd either by others *Malice*, or by their own *Remiſneſs*.

IT is undoubtedly the Deſign and Uſe of *Civil Government* to ſecure to the governed Society *Peace and Quietneſs* in general, and to every Man in particular his *Life* and *Limbs*, his *good Name* and his *Goods*, inviolable from all injurious Attempts upon them; or at leaſt to provide, as far as is poſſible, that none ſhall invade them, without feeling the Effects of *publick* Juſtice puniſhing either his *bold Invaſion*, or his more *ſubtle* and *diſguis'd Improbity*.

ALL this is true, and it is too evidently ſo to enlarge much upon it, at leaſt in the way of Proof. But though this is the *moſt obvious Effect*, and perhaps the *directeſt* and moſt *immediate* View, that Men had, the generality of them at leaſt, in forming Society and Government, *viz.* to make Security and Proviſions for themſelves in *external* Things, yet I conceive this is *not the only* beneficial Effect and Influence which *Society* has, and that this may be made appear and enlarg'd upon with very good Uſe, without going into a *common Place* on the one Hand, or into an *unprofitable or a mere*

mere Controverſy on the other, and alſo without laying a Foundation, which I ſhould be very ſorry to do, for carrying *publick Power beyond its juſt Bounds*, and into a Tyranny over Mens *Conſciences*.

I CONFESS I do not perceive it to be an ill Inference from the viſible happy Effects of *ſocial Life* in relation to Mens *Minds*, that they might have been in *ſome Degree foreſeen*, and probably were not altogether *excluded* out of the *Intention and View* either of *wiſe Men*, or much leſs of the *All-wiſe* and *Good* GOD in the *Inſtitution of Society* and what belongs to it; however I ſhall content my ſelf to put my Propoſition in the following Words, *viz.*

THAT SOCIETY MERELY CIVIL *has very happy Influences in regard to the Improvement and Ornaments of the* MIND.

MY View in this Part of my Argument is to ſhew, that *Society* and *Polity as ſuch* (*i. e.* ſuppoſing it to be well order'd) and the *mere Civilizing* Men, does improve their Minds, does by innumerable Methods revive and freſhen Man's natural Notices and Propenſions to good and generous, uſeful and lovely Actions, that it furniſhes to the *ingenuous* ſuch frequent Opportunities of putting them into Act, as begets and confirms the Habits of them; and that even to the *leſs ingenuous*, to the negligent and ſlothful Part of Mankind, there will here occur an *importuner* kind of Argument and Motives, ſuch as are ſuited to their Temper, and ſuch as may poſſibly prove of very great Uſe to the *Perſons* them-

ſelves on whom they operate, as well as they will be evidently and certainly of *Uſe to the Society.*

AS that would be extremely *imperfect*, or ſcarce have any Pretence to be call'd *Society*, which had not Proviſions to ſecure to Men their *Lives* and *Properties*, ſo would that alſo be a very *imperfect Society* (if ſuch a one can be ſuppos'd) nor would it obtain the Name of a *civiliz'd* Part of Mankind, that ſhould in ſome tolerable Manner defend its Members from *external* and from *inteſtine Violencies*, and yet have *no Influence* to excite them to *virtuous* Actions, or to make their *Manners* and Converſation mutually agreeable, decent, and lovely.

BUT this is what can never be the Caſe in a *wiſe Society*, and under *good Government*. The Suppoſition is very unnatural, that whilſt *Civil Polity* ſhall take great Care of the *Body* and Things relating to it, the *Soul* and its whole Concerns muſt be totally and utterly excluded.

IT is a *nice Diſtinction* indeed and a *Chimerical* one to *naturalize* and admit the *Body* into a *Community* and to leave the *Soul* at the ſame Time an *Alien*. For the *Body* and *Mind* have in Reality a cloſer Connexion, I preſume, than that any Inſtitution whatever can be capable of happily affecting the *former*, and yet have no Concernment with or Influence at all upon the *latter*.

WHEN Men rightly and ſeriouſly conſider the *Law of their Nature*, they will perceive that after they are *combin'd into Civil Society*, they are *capable* of giving, and that they will by no Means ſatisfy theſe Obliga-

tions except they *do give* thoſe they unite withal, not only their Aſſiſtance towards the ſecuring of their *Lives* and *Properties*, but alſo the Pleaſure and Advantage which will *naturally ſpring out of their practiſing* VIRTUE. And whilſt they are both conſcious to themſelves of *their own* Obligations of this Sort, and remember as they cannot fail to do, that the very *ſame Law and Obligation* is graven by their common *Lord and Maker* upon the Hearts of all thoſe they are united and converſe with, why is it a *vain* Hope, why is it not an Expectation moſt *juſtly founded*, that amongſt *other* Advantages of SOCIETY it will be a Mean (unleſs it be otherwiſe by ſome accidental Fault) of *improving* one another's *Minds*, and of exciting to ſuch Things as are *beautiful, and perfective of Human Nature?*

IT is utterly impoſſible *really* to ſeparate from *Virtue* its *good Influences* upon Men in any kind of *Partnerſhip* with thoſe that practiſe it to their Benefit and Comfort, or *really* to ſeparate from *Vice* very pernicious and hurtful Effects upon *Society*; and therefore the *encouraging* the one, and *diſcouraging* the other, by all proper Methods that ſhall occur, by the Hopes of *Rewards*, and by Reſtraint and the Fear of *Puniſhment*, this is a very reaſonable Aim and Expectation in forming *Civil Society*, and one very important Part of the *Civil Magiſtrate's* Care and Buſineſs.

IT is plain, that *Proviſions* of this Nature, whilſt they reſtrain or allure vicious Men, do prevent a great deal of *Vice* and *Wickedneſs*, which would otherwiſe be practiſed; and ſo do prevent the *Miſchief* to *Society*,

that

that is inſeparable from ſuch Practices: Nor can it be denied, that the *wicked Mind* may be *amended and chang'd* under theſe *Reſtraints*.

SO that though there is *no Virtue* indeed in not doing ill, being reſtrain'd by the Fear of Puniſhment; though it be certain that a *forc'd Innocence* has no Merit or Commendation in it, yet it may be true, that there is a *Felicity* in being kept under ſuch a *Diſcipline*, and *ſo great a Felicity* too, as may *diſpoſe* to, and at laſt end in, *Virtue real and pure*, as the preſent Condition of Humanity will allow us to hope for.

CUSTOM of doing ill in any ſort does evidently increaſe the *Diſpoſition* to thoſe ill Actions; and by the ſame Reaſon, according to the Rule of contraries, and according to common Experience too, *Omiſſion* and *Diſuſe*, from whatever *Principle* it proceeds, leſſens the Appetite, and gives freer room for cooler and better Thoughts.

TO act from a Motive of *Fear* is certainly no Commendation of the *Ingenuity* of thoſe that act on ſuch a Principle; but yet it is a Happineſs to have ſuch Motives to avoid what is evil, where better will not operate at all; which is perhaps at ſome times, and in ſome Degree more or leſs, the Caſe of the beſt of our *Species*, as well as the more general and ordinary Caſe of the worſt part of it: And therefore they, who are ſo very rigid as to condemn all Actions, where *any Degree* of ſuch a Principle intermixes itſelf with others that are better, and who will not allow that the Intereſts of *Virtue* can be at all concern'd with ſuch Motives as do moſt affect the leaſt ingenuous, they ſeem

to have Notions ſomewhat too ſublime and fine to ſuit with the *real State* of Mankind.

IT would without doubt ſhew a much greater *Ingenuity* in Men to obey the Divine Laws, on Account of their *intrinſick Excellency*, out of *Love* to GOD, and a noble Ambition to *tranſcribe*, as it were, *his Nature*, and grow into his *Likeneſs*; but yet it is not to be doubted, that many a Man has ſo liv'd and carried on a *gradual Improvement* in himſelf, as to have obtain'd the Favour of GOD, and the great inviſible Rewards attending it, whoſe *firſt Obedience* has had a great Alloy of the *Servile* in it, which Time and Uſe, with the Aſſiſtance of GOD's Grace, by Degrees wore off, ſo that it became *pure and filial*; and *Love* being perfected overcame and caſt out the *Servile* Fear.

IF the Terrors of the Lord, made known to Men in his Word, are one great Inducement to forſake Sin, and a means not unworthy that Wiſdom to appoint, which knoweth and contriv'd Man's Frame, and has ſet the Principle of Fear within him, as one of the moſt powerful Springs of Action, why ſhould human Diſcipline, and the Sanctions of human Laws, be thought utterly uncapable of *miniſtring to*, or of being an *Occaſion* even of producing *Virtue*?

THE acting ſo as it becomes a Man to do, and abſtaining from Evil out of the dread of future and inviſible Puniſhment, and the doing the ſame Things for fear of temporal Penalties, is not ſo properly to be aſcrib'd, I conceive, to two quite different Principles, as to *One* Principle, wherein there is indeed much Diſſimilitude and Difference, in reſpect to the Degree and

Weight

Weight of Motive. If the Fear of human Puniſhment ſhall at any time move a Man more than, or equally with, the Fear of thoſe that GOD has threaten'd hereafter, that Man will act very unreaſonably, in ſuffering himſelf to be ſo influenced by the really leſs weighty Motive; but however it is not to be conceiv'd, that GOD would have call'd us to Virtue, and Obedience to his Precepts, by the Influence of Fear *at all*, if it were ſo abſolutely unworthy and baſe a Motive, and ſo utterly unprofitable to all good Purpoſes, as it may ſometimes appear even to grave and good Men, and ſo be wrong repreſented by them, whilſt they are far from having any Prejudices *againſt Virtue*.

THE Man who by his Situation receives *the leaſt* Benefit of *Civil Government* and *Society*, in regard to Converſation, and the Improvement or Ornament of his Mind, the *Cottager*, the *Shepherd*, and the Man whoever he be that comes neareſt to the *ſolitary* and the *ſavage Life*, if he be *uncourteous*, *i. e.* if he be unwilling to do kindneſs to others, where he can do it eaſily and without Prejudice to himſelf; if, inſtead of this, his uſual Carriage and his Temper is to *moleſt* and *diſoblige the Few* that he has Opportunity to converſe withal, this Man is certainly much to be blam'd, and yet the Man, whoſe Way of Life engages him in almoſt *continual* and *politer Company*, will eaſily be diſcern'd to be ſtill *more* inexcuſable and blame-worthy, if he ſhould do the ſame thing.

ONE offends at leaſt againſt the *Dictates of Humanity*, taught him by his own *Senſe and Reaſon*, if he ſhould

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be ſuppos'd to have had very little of other Inſtruction.

THE other offends againſt the ſame, with this Aggravation, that living amongſt the *moſt civiliz'd* Part of Mankind, every *Buſineſs* he is engag'd in, and every *Man* he meets almoſt helps to *refreſh* thoſe Ideas and Sentiments that he has found his *own Reaſon* to approve of and whiſper to him; every thing contributes to cultivate his *natural Propenſions* to love and oblige his Fellow-Creatures; to *preſerve* his *Humanity*, and to ſupply a plentiful Variety of *Occaſions* and *Opportunities* for it to *exert* it ſelf.

BUT ſince it is laid to the Charge of all *Civil Societies* without *Exception*, that they teach Men to be HYPOCRITES, and yet ſome Inſtances are given, in order to make out the Charge, where there is no *Diſſimulation* taught or practis'd but what is *laudable* or *innocent*, it will be proper (and the Subject I have undertaken would be imperfectly treated without it) to examine a little in what reſpects or inſtances *Art and Diſſimulation* are *allowable*, it being no ways needful in vindicating *Civil Life* as to the Imputation of DOLUS MALUS, to deny and exclude every kind of *Diſſimulation* and of *Reſerve*.

THE *Concealment*, the *Diſſembling* of our Thoughts is not always evil in it ſelf; it may be *innocent*, *adviſeable*, *praiſe-worthy* in ſome Caſes, as well as *criminal* and *baſe* in others; and accordingly there are in all Languages *Words* expreſſive of it, which do admit either of a *good or ill Senſe*, as well as others that *determine* it to an ill one.

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As to that part of Converſation, which paſſes under the Name of *Compliments*, and is moſt in Uſe with thoſe that are accounted the *politeſt*, I ſhall not undertake, nor does my Subject want that I ſhould *juſtify* the *immoderate* and *extravagant Practice* of it. I can diſapprove and condemn it, as I think Reaſon and Religion teach me to do, and yet without giving up what I have already advanc'd, or weakening what I am about to advance upon this Head. The Ends and Purpoſes of *Society* may require that Men ſhould be ready to *expreſs a mutual Love* to one another, and Willingneſs to aſſiſt and ſerve each other on all *reaſonable and proper* Occaſions that ſhall offer, but ſure Society may be preſerv'd, and all the Ends of it anſwer'd, and much better anſwer'd, though its ſeveral Members ſhould not in *ſtudied* Expreſſions of the *ſtrongeſt Import* profeſs to one another *ſuch an Attachment* and *Reſpect* as they know they have not, and though they ſhould not laviſhly promiſe *Services* they ſhall never think on more from the Time they ſo wantonly ſpeak of them.

HERE therefore is an *Inſincerity* allow'd to be *culpable and diſhoneſt*, which is indeed too much found in *Society*, but we are ſufficiently clear of all Objection on this Account, becauſe it is plain enough, that this Practice of *extravagant Compliments* and ſtrong Profeſſions of great Services never intended, is not requiſite, is not uſeful to Society, but is pernicious and hurtful to it.

AND if there be *other Arts, other kinds of Diſſimulation* and *Reſerve*, as I am ready to allow there are, which are *indeed requiſite* to *Society*, I hope they are capable

pable of being prov'd *good and innocent*, built upon a *Foundation of Nature*, and no ways contrary to the Precepts of that *Religion*, which allows and teaches Men to be *wiſe as Serpents*, provided they take care at the ſame time to be *harmleſs as Doves*. It would be far from conſulting the Honour and Credit of the *Religion* CHRIST has taught us, to repreſent it as encouraging *ſuch a Simplicity* and *Openneſs* as is evidently attended with *hurtful* and *pernicious* Conſequences. But this is an *Excurſion*, and more than came regularly into conſideration here according to the *Method* before laid down.

IT is the part of a *wiſe* Man, to keep a watchful Government over his *Thoughts*, and the moſt *ſecret Motions* of his Heart; and he that does ſo will undoubtedly have the *feweſt* Thoughts ſuch as he need to be aſham'd of, *diſſemble* and conceal. But ſome ſuch Thoughts will ariſe in the Hearts of the wiſeſt and beſt Men after all their Care, which if they ſhould every one lay open to thoſe they convers'd with, without *any Reſerve* or *Diſſimulation*, Society would without doubt be greatly injur'd, and Converſation render'd an Offence, or become a Snare. But then I would obſerve withal, that ſuch a *cynical* manner of Converſation without *any kind of Reſerve*, ſuch an impudent Simplicity, would not only be hurtful to Society and uncivil, but it would be againſt the Dictates of *Religion*, it would be *unreaſonable*, nay, and I may add *unnatural*. For what did the Philoſophers intend by that Maxim and Advice of theirs ſo frequent in their Mouths, that we ſhould FOLLOW NATURE? They did not mean the gratifying of every Appetite

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and Inclination that ſhould ariſe in Men, but they call'd it *following Nature* in many Caſes (juſt the contrary) *not* to indulge their Appetites, but to put on them thoſe *Reſtraints*, which, becauſe they found that *Reaſon* dictated them, they rightly eſteemed *natural*, or becoming and perfective of *human Nature*.

He who whilſt he is endeavoring to conquer evil Thoughts *conceals* them, who is aſham'd not only of *publiſhing* them, but of being *privy to and capable* of them, this Man is in a likely way to get rid of them, or rather has conquer'd and deſtroy'd them the Moment of their Birth: Whilſt he that takes a contrary Method, and makes his worſt Thoughts the Subject of Converſation, finds a Difficulty to break thro' thoſe *Reſtraints* which Nature has provided, in order to prevent it. The *Diſcoveries* a Man makes in deſpight of ſuch *Reſtraints*, conſider'd with reſpect to thoſe he ſo converſes with, will be either highly *offenſive*, or if leſs diſpleaſing the more *hurtful*, and the Effect of them with regard to *Himſelf* will be the *fixing a vicious Habit* of Mind and Thought, which by following *Nature and Reaſon*, as well as by conſulting *Good Manners* better, he might have eaſily and happily prevented.

We need not ſcruple therefore to confeſs, that Men by being combin'd into *Civil Societies* are accuſtom'd to uſe *Art* and *Diſſimulation* in concealing their ill Qualities, in hiding immodeſt, or ill-natur'd, or any other ſort of Thoughts that are unbecoming them, when they are not able entirely and preſently to get quit of them: We need not be ſhy, I ſay, to confeſs this, whilſt we can make it appear, that there is a *juſt Foundation* for ſuch Behavior in *Nature* and *Reaſon*, from

that general Principle of *Benevolence*, that excites us not to *diſturb* and *moleſt*, but to *pleaſe*, when it can be done innocently, and to oblige our *Fellow-Creatures*, and whilſt we rightly perſwade our ſelves, that there are *Natural Barriers*, as well as thoſe which *Civility* has ſet againſt an *offenſive Unreſerve*, and the *vile* Behavior of a *Cynick*.

To *diſſemble* therefore, *e. g.* either *Pains of Body* ſuppoſe, or *inward Ruffles* and *Diſcompoſures* of Mind; to put on as much as is poſſible a *chearful Countenance*, whilſt the Heart is inclin'd more to *Sadneſs*; to do thus for the Eaſe and Pleaſure of thoſe we converſe with, where it is no *Concern* of theirs, nor could be any *Advantage* to us that they ſhould be made acquainted with our *Griefs*: To *hide* our unwarrantable *Reſentments* againſt our Brethren, founded chiefly or only it may be in our *own Spleen*: To *conceal* our too *harſh Opinion* of their ſmaller Faults: To *diſſemble* our *faſtidious Delicacy* on Account of their unavoidable Imperfections, or our *Contempt* of their ſuppos'd inferior Wit or Skill: To *hide* all theſe ill Thoughts, and at once perhaps to *extinguiſh* them, or elſe to *hide* them at leaſt, till with the Help of Reaſon we *are* able to *conquer* them.

To *diſſemble* an Inclination we may have to acquire or do a thing, in order to forego it upon a reaſonable Motive in Favor of another.

To repreſent a thing, wherein there is ſome *Trouble* and *Self-denial*, as rather a *Pleaſure* to us, wherein we can be helpful and beneficial to our Friends and Neighbours.

THESE and ſuch-like *innocent and good Arts* we acknowledge that living in well-regulated *Societies* does improve us in. Men united in *Communities* under *Laws* and *Government* will practiſe them more than others living without, or under very looſe and imperfect ones, would do: And this is the Reaſon that ſuch a manner of Converſation, wherein they are practiſed, has obtain'd the Names of *Civility* and of *Urbanity*, which are deriv'd from *Latin* Words ſignifying a *Community* and a *City*. But yet we ſhould not forget, that this Behavior has *another* Name too, *viz.* that of HUMANITY, becauſe a *Benevolence* and *Love to Mankind* which is the *Parent* of it, is *rooted in our Nature*, and is the *great Ornament* of it.

IN ſhort then, the *Art that is agreeable to Nature and Reaſon*, that Artfulneſs of Behavior which means and does *nothing but what is kind and beneficial* to our Neighbour, THAT is improv'd and cultivated by the *Civil Life*. But the *Artifices* that ſpring from, or are mix'd with *Unrighteouſneſs*, and are Productive of *injurious hurtful Effects*, THESE every wiſe Society, and all well regulated Governments, do fall in with the *Dictates of Reaſon* and the Precepts of the *Chriſtian Religion*, to baniſh and diſcourage as much as is poſſible.

I COME now to obſerve,

THAT *we are under Obligations antecedent in their Nature to thoſe that bind us as Members of a Civil Society*; or in other Words,

THAT the LAWS OF SOCIETY, although they do, with every thing elſe that is included in *ſocial and*

civil Life, excite to and encourage MORAL VIRTUE, yet are they by no means the ARBITRARY MAKERS thereof, by no means the SOURCE and ORIGIN to which it is *ſolely or ultimately to be referr'd.*

WE are told, that *Epicurus* did refer *the whole Matter of juſt and unjuſt* to UTILITY, to the ſeparate, ſelfiſh, and imaginary Intereſt of particular Men, without any the leaſt Conſideration of a *Divine Law*, or even of *human Laws*, provided their *Penalties* could any ways be avoided; and *others* have ſaid that COMMUNITIES *might do juſtly whatever was for their Advantage.*

THE Queſtion is not here, whether, all Things duly conſider'd, there be not *upon the whole Utility annex'd or appendant to that which is right and good*, which may be held in the Affirmative very agreeably to our Principle and Argument. In this we have no Diſpute with our Adverſaries, we allow it for Truth, and many a perſuaſive Addreſs to Men on the behalf of Virtue and Piety has been built upon it, that *Convenience* and *Utility* do generally ſpeaking *accede to the Law of Nature*, and are join'd to ſuch a Conduct as Reaſon directs. The ſteady Attachment to Virtue and Honour is advantagious to *particular Men*, and ſo in *Societies* of Men the general Practice of *moral Virtues* has, by the general Laws that GOD has ſubjected Things to a natural and viſible Tendency to make a People happy, as the *contrary Practices* by the Nature of them cannot but introduce and multiply *Miſchiefs* and *Confuſion.*

BUT it is abſurd to imagine there can be any ſuch Rule of proper rational or happy Conduct of Men towards

one

one another, as this *private and ſeparate Utility*. For as every Man's Aim, upon this Suppoſition, would interfere in infinite Caſes with the Aims of *other Men*, there would follow inſtead of Convenience inevitable *Wars* and *Quarrels*, becauſe continual Grounds and Occaſions of them *muſt ariſe upon this Foot*. A Man, or a *Body of Men*, may poſſibly in *this or that Inſtance* have the Power to procure their *own Intereſt and preſent Will*, by acting without reſpect to any other Rule *but their Will*. But then this Method of Proceeding will be *retaliated* upon them in other Caſes, and at other Times, by thoſe who are ſtronger; and it will preclude them from a Convenience, which no Men nor Societies can ſubſiſt tolerably without, I mean that of *League and Contract* with others. For *Contracts* cannot be enter'd into without ſome *Confidence* in Mens *Faith and Honour*; and Faith and Honour are nothing but *mere Names*, have no Reality or Subſtance, where Men will obſerve no Rule but merely that of their *ſingle* and it may be *imaginary* Convenience, *detach'd from and oppoſite to a more general and publick Good*.

It is pleaded, that *Man*, as every *other Animal*, is always and in all Caſes ſway'd by his Intereſt, or what he apprehends pleaſant and commodious for him.

Now here we might obſerve in the firſt Place, that *mere Inſtinct* teaches even *brute* Creatures in many Inſtances to *forego their own Convenience and Gratification, for the ſake of others of their Kind*, and eſpecially for the ſake of their *young ones*, not but there are Inſtances of the *young* alſo returning *that ſelf-denying Aſſiſtance* to their

their aged and helpleſs Dams, as * *Philo* obſerves of the *Storks*. And the whole Nations of *Bees* and *Ants*, or whatever other Animals *labour for a common Proviſion* do forego their *private Gratifications* for the Sake of the *common Good*.

BUT we are to obſerve further, that *Man*, tho' he is indeed an *Animal*, and therefore has ſome Qualities common to him with the Brutes, yet is a *noble and excellent* Animal, with a Soul of *Heavenly Extract*, and capable of bearing the *Divine Image*. We ought with * *Antoninus* to conſider, that *as leſs perfect Beings do exiſt for the Sake of thoſe that are better, ſo more excellent Beings, ſuch as Man, do exiſt by the Creator's Will, and in Subordination to his Glory, for the ſake and Benefit of one another*.

MANKIND appear evidently to be deſign'd for *Society with one another* in an eminent and *peculiar Manner* by the *Faculty of Speech* ſo peculiar and proper to them. *Providence* has furniſh'd Man (and not without a great deal of Apparatus and Contrivance as *Cicero* obſerves) with the admirable Faculty of *Speech*, to make the *Divine Gift of Reaſon* more uſeful, and accommodate it to the Circumſtances of human State. Thus have we the Means to learn what we are ignorant of, and to teach others what we know. By Means of this we mutually exhort and perſwade our Fellow-Creatures to do what we are deſirous to have done, and what we

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* * *See the Quotations of theſe Authors, with other good Obſervations and References belonging to this Argument in* Grotius's Prolegom. ad Libr. de Jure B. & P. *and the Notes thereon.*

could

could not have done without ſuch Aſſiſtance and *joint Endeavors*. Thus Men are qualify'd to form Leagues and Treaties, neceſſary to their commodious and quiet Living, *originally to found* COMMUNITIES, to *eſtabliſh* and *ſecure* them by *debating and enacting good Laws*, and tranſmitting them to ſucceeding Generations, if not *orally* alone, yet by Arts that have been invented to *carry on the ſame Purpoſes*, and to *extend* the numerous and excellent Benefits of the *Gift of Speech*.

BY Means of this, under the Conduct and Guidance of Reaſon Men are led, as it were by an *Amphion*'s ſoft perſwaſive Harp, from unſocial, wild, and barbarous, into *ſocial* and *civil Life*; for which they are not only peculiarly *qualify'd*, but have evidently a *natural Appetite* and *ſtrong Inclination*, which *Reaſon* perfectly approves of, and urges to exert, whilſt yet the *Advantages of Society* cannot (as it is equally manifeſt) be obtain'd nor hop'd for, without every one that enters into it *departing in ſeveral Reſpects from his natural Rights*, and ſtipulating, either expreſsly or tacitly, *ſuch* Offices and things on his Part, as cannot in many *Inſtances* be diſcharg'd without a *Self-Denial*, and without abridging himſelf of ſome Gratifications and Conveniencies he might otherwiſe have enjoy'd.

IT is a manifeſt *Untruth* therefore to aſſert, that *Nature* and *Reaſon*, and a *Divine Law* written by our Maker upon all our Hearts, does never direct and prompt Men to *forego their own Gratifications on the behalf of other Men*.

THE CHRISTIAN INSTITUTES indeed do *inculcate this the moſt*, and ſet it in the *faireſt Light*; yet an *Ulpian*, a *Florentinus*, or a *Heathen Paulus*, and every Man

Man that us'd his Reaſon rightly, could diſcern the COGNATION *of Men to one another by their Nature*, and from *this Cognation* and *ſocial Appetite*, ordain'd and implanted by the *great Author of their Nature*, could diſcern and deduce AN OBLIGATION TO LOVE ONE ANOTHER, and for Men to *want* ſometimes themſelves ſome leſſer Conveniencies which they could not have enjoy'd without great Prejudice and Diſadvantage to the Publick, without making their Fellow-Creatures, to whom they have *ſo near a Cognation*, ſuffer wrongfully greater Damage and Inconvenience than the *ſeperate Pleaſure* could amount to which Men who are addicted to ſenſual Gratifications, and by Conſequence ſee Things in a very falſe *Light*, are *perverſely* fond of, and *inordinately* purſue thro' *Frauds*, thro' *Rapine*, *Wars*, and *all the Miſchiefs* and *Miſeries* that attend them.

WE cannot inſtance, I think, in any *moral Virtue*, which will give the Adverſary, to the important Truth we are eſtabliſhing, greater room to oppoſe, and play off his Subtleties than in that of JUSTICE.

MEN ſee that *human Laws* do both claim, and are every where allow'd, to have *ſomething to do* in the *particularizing of Juſtice*, whether in the *Deſcription* or the *Practice* of it; and it is freely admitted, that *no one can be a righteous and juſt Man with a total Diſregard to the Laws of his Country*. But when it is inferr'd from hence, that therefore *human Laws are the ultimate only Meaſure of Juſt and Unjuſt*, that they are the *prime Source*, and do *abſolutely or originally conſtitute the Difference of Right and Wrong*, here is a *falſe* Conſequence very illogically drawn from right and true Premiſes,

miſes, and a very *pernicious* one too. For *that* cannot be a *primary Rule and Meaſure* which muſt be meaſur'd and faſhion'd it ſelf by *another ſuperior Rule*, *that* cannot be a *firſt Source* which *receives* what it has, and owes it ſelf to another Fountain, which is here the Caſe. And for the other part of the Charge in calling it a *pernicious* as well as *falſe* Inference, I may without ſaying much leave it to any ſober Man to judge, how it is likely or poſſible for *them* to have a due Senſe of Juſtice, to have a due Eſteem and Love of *that*, or of any *other* moral Virtue, who make it to depend upon, and therefore to be *ambulatory*, and changeable as is the *Will of Men*.

IT is a Shame that in arguing *ſuch a Cauſe*, againſt ſuch *Prodigies* of Principles I ſhould have a *Chriſtian* Adverſary; μὴ γένοιτο! Let us hope, and GOD grant we may ſee better Things! I am ſorry I muſt believe or greatly fear that I have an Adverſary *even in a Heathen Philoſopher*, one who did not want the *Talent of Reaſoning*, and in moſt other Things us'd it *much better* than I doubt he did in *this Caſe*. But if any Perſon will pleaſe to give a more probable Account and Interpretation of ſome Paſſages I have ſtumbled at, I ſhall be glad to find my Suſpicion to have been weakly founded, and ſhall beg Pardon of *my Friends of* QUEENS, and the reſt of his moſt zealous Admirers, for having been ſo *free in my Critiques* upon the *Great Stagyrite*, whom the *Greater Roman* ſomewhere in his *Tuſculans* places I remember next in his eſteem to PLATO.

TO ſay the Truth, I think ARISTOTLE in his *Ethicks* does broadly hint, that *Juſtice* at leaſt (if not

other Virtues) is a *political Creature*, and is not referrible any higher than to *human Conſtitutions*. I put it in theſe Words, becauſe he was *neither clear nor fix'd*, as I take it, in his Notions about this Matter.

I KNOW that *Grotius* (*Lib. 2do. de Jur. B. c.* XX. § 44.) after obſerving, that *Epicurus* made nothing of Juſtice but an *empty Name*, by making it to depend upon *mere human Compact* without any Reference to the *Supreme Being*, does add that *Ariſtotle ſaw this Connexion*. But I humbly conceive, that the Paſſages I am going to mention, which look another way, did not occur to our *excellent Author at that time*, and that *too great a Streſs* is laid upon the *ſingle* Argument and Quotation brought to confirm his Aſſertion, *viz.* that *Ariſtotle* ſays in his Book *de Rep. c.* X. *That the People will leaſt of all apprehend an unjuſt and cruel Uſage from a Prince that is Religious*—ἥτλον φοβεῖνλαι τὸ παθεῖν τι παράνομον ὑπὸ τῶν τοιέτων ἐὰν δισιδαίμονα νομίζωσιν εἶναι τὲν ἀρχόνλα.

IT may be agreeable to Men of an *exact and nice Taſte* to examine into this Matter (only as a *curious Problem*) a little *deeper*; at the ſame time it is certain, that we ought to have an *equal* Regard and Veneration for *Truths*, which we know to be ſo, and to be Truths of very *great Importance* too, whether *Ariſtotle* ſaw *more* or *leſs* of them, and whether he *ſufficiently and carefully* heeded them *or not*.

IN the Entrance upon his Subject he ſays, * *There is ſo great Diſſention and Error as to what Things are fair and juſt, the Subjects of Political Science, that they*

* Lib. 1. c. 3.

ſeem

ſeem to ſubſiſt by human Eſtabliſhment only and not from Nature, Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή.

I KNOW that he often ſpeaks of the τὸ νόμιμον, and the τὸ ἴσον, and ſo of the τὸ παράνομον, and the τὸ ἄνισον as *different* Things, but with all his elaborate and prolix Explication of what this *Equal* is, he ſo explains it as that it is very difficult, if at all poſſible, to diſcern *any Difference* betwixt *that* and the τὸ νόμιμον. He talks of a Judges dividing a controverted Thing into *two equal Parts,* * and ſays that the Judge's Buſineſs conſiſts in taking away from one and adding to another till there be an Equality, and ſince this cannot eaſily be done to divide Things themſelves that are in Diſpute, the Difference is often valu'd and ſettled by *Money,* which is call'd νόμισμα, becauſe it receives its Value and Uſe from the *Law,* and from human Compact. This would certainly be an odd way of a Man's differencing and diſtinguiſhing the τὸ νόμιμον and the τὸ ἴσον, or rather it could never into the Head of a Man that referr'd the latter to its *true and proper Source.*

HE ſays, † That *the Law commands to live in the Practice of every Virtue, ſo that the Determinations of the Law diſciplining Men for the Benefit of the Publick are the efficient Cauſes of Univerſal Virtue,* Καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἀρετὴν προστάττει ζῆν, καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην μοχθηρίαν κωλύει ὁ νόμος. Τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς ἐστὶ τῶν νομίμων ὅσα γεγονοδέτηται περὶ παιδείας τῆς πρὸς τὸ κοινόν. Here fol-

* Lib. 1. c. 4. † *Ibid.* cap. 2. p. 201. *Edit. Oxon.*

lows indeed something to *qualify* a little the Grosness of this, in a distinguishing betwixt *private Goodness*, and such a Goodness as has *Influence upon the Publick*, whereby a Man shews himself a useful Member of the Community.

HE says, * That *since he that offends against the Laws is unjust, and he that acts according to them is just, it is evident that all Things determin'd by the Laws are just in a manner*—πάντα τὰ νόμιμα ἐσί πως δίκαια. See his Confusion! The Truth was not so perfectly out of his Sight but it oblig'd him to throw in *that qualifying*, shall I say, or *that contradicting and demolishing* πως; which *Salvo* is agreeable to and may be explain'd by what *He* says in the very next Page, *viz.* That the Law encourages some sort of Actions and discourages others *well, when it is made wisely, and otherwise, when it is made inconsiderately* Ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δὲ ὁ ἀπερριδιασμένως.

I KNOW he says *Chap.* 7. of the same Book, *That a Thing is right and just either by positive human Law or by Nature.* Now then he will establish the Truth surely in *establishing this Distinction.* Again we are disappointed, *again* the formal and the just Distinction *in the Illustration and Proof of* it vanishes and dwindles into nothing. For he soon adds, Δοκεῖ δὲ ἐνίοις πάντα εἶναι τοιαῦτα (νομικά) ὅτι τὸ μὲν φύσει ἀκίνητον καὶ πανταχοῦ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν—τὰ δὲ δίκαια κινούμενα ἐσῶσι, i. e. *Some are of Opinion that all Things are included under the former Branch of the Division, and to be referr'd to positive human Constitution, because that which is by Nature*

* *Ibid.* c. 1. p. 195.

is

is unvariable, and alike every where; but they ſee Things pertaining to Right and Juſtice to be mutable and various. To this he ſays, *This is not altogether ſo, perhaps with the Gods it is not at all ſo, but with us ſome yet not all Things are right and juſt by Nature, and yet are mutable,* τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἔχον ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὡς· ἢ τοι παρά γε τοῖς θεοῖς ἴσως οὐδαμῶς ἔχον· παρ' ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ μέν πη φύσει κινητόν, ἀ μέν τοι πᾶν. I will give the Reader *Lambinus*'s *Latin* Verſion of this dark and ſtrange Paſſage, *Sed hoc non ità eſt omni quidem ex parte, eſt certè ex aliquâ; quanquam apud Deos fortaſſe nullâ exparte ità ſe habet; ſed apud nos eſt profectò aliquid etiam naturale mutabile, non tamen omne.* The Things that follow are alſo very odd. The Similitude by which he pretends to take off all the Difficulty, *viz.* that the *Right-hand* is ſtronger than the *Left* by Nature, and yet it happens, that ſometimes Perſons uſe the *Left-hand* as well as the *Right*, is unworthy of the *Pomp* with which it is introduc'd, and of *Him* that uſes it—He then proceeds to obſerve, that Conſtitutions and Deciſions of *Right* were extremely various, and differ'd as widely as *Meaſures of Wine* or *Grain* did in ſeveral Places; which diſcovers too much of a *Panchant*, I think, to ſide rather with thoſe of whom he had been ſpeaking, who referr'd all to *human Conſtitution*, and who thought that *nothing was immutably and by Nature right and juſt*, or at the leaſt it diſcovers a very great *Perplexity* and *Embarraſſment*.

LET us come therefore to *the Point*, and ſay a Thing, which ARISTOTLE by ſome of the foregoing Quotations appears not to have been altogether ignorant of, and yet it was not acknowledg'd by him *uni-*

formly

formly and in its plain Conſequences, but ſeems commonly forgot and unheeded when it ſhould have been remember'd by him.

ALL *human Laws* have their *obligatory Force* in this, that they are juſt and regular Applications in and to *particular Caſes* of that which was *before enjoin'd more indefinitely and generally*, that they are conſonant to and within the Compaſs of a *Divine Law*. Human Laws which have any Force to bind Men, and to ſettle in particular Inſtances what is juſt and unjuſt, are nothing but the *general practical Principles of the Law of Nature*, or of the *Divine Law* in ſome kind or other apply'd to Objects by *particular Concluſions*, according to the various Circumſtances of Things.

OR again, in other Terms, which I think none have ever *expreſsly* contradicted, though they import, or at leaſt by *plain Conſequence imply* the ſame Thing which I have before expreſs'd, *human Laws* do not bind the Conſciences of Men, and they ought not to be obey'd whenever they are *contrary to the Law and Will of GOD* any ways made known to us.

THIS may be made clearer to ſome perhaps by an Inſtance. The *Importation* or *Exportation* of *Corn*, or *Wooll*, of *Wines* or *Silks*, or other Commodities, where there is *no Law* concerning them, and eſpecially if Perſons do not of themſelves apprehend ſuch Exportation or Importation to be detrimental to the Society, is a Thing indifferent, which Men may do or not do at their Pleaſure. But a *Law of the Society*, a publick *Prohibition* raiſes ſuch an Action from its former *Indifferency*, and it becomes a *Point of Conſcience*; it is an unlawful and ill Thing to *export* or *import* any Thing contrary

contrary to that Prohibition. But let us ſuppoſe a *publick Law and Diſcipline to train Men up to and engage them in a Piratical Life*, and that a whole Community ſhould agree to give Rewards and Praiſe to ſuch of its Members as diſtinguiſh themſelves the moſt and ſucceed the beſt *in Acts of Piracy*. Such publick Law, Diſcipline, and Encouragement would have no Effect to make the Things enjoin'd and recommended either *Praiſe-worthy*, or *Innocent* and *Lawful*. Whence ariſes this *great Difference?* From *hence* moſt certainly and evidently, that in the *one Caſe* the human Law was agreeable to the *general Rule of Reaſon*, and came within the *general Divine Law*, that Men ſhall do or omit a Thing that does not break in upon any Law of GOD, for the Peace and Good of the Society of which they are Members, whenever it ſhall be certainly known, and *affirm'd too by the publick Wiſdom*, that it really is ſo; and in the *other Caſe*, the Things enjoin'd and recommended were *not within the Compaſs of any Divine Law*, but were moſt plainly incompatible with and contrary to all Principles of Equity and Reaſon.

IT is becauſe GOD is eſſentially righteous, holy, merciful, beneficent and good, and becauſe He has given us the Knowledge of Himſelf and his Perfections, and made us capable of *bearing his Image*; it is from hence that we know and diſtinguiſh what is *Good* and what is *Evil*, and that we are oblig'd to practiſe ſuitably to this Knowledge.

WE ought never to abſtract the Conſideration of the WILL OF GOD, but regard it conjointly with the Reaſon of Things.

Now

NOW GOD hath ſhewed Man what is *Good*, what his *Will* is, I mean, *beſides* the many reiterated Precepts that we find in the *Sacred Writings*, which I am not here to argue from.

" * WE may collect from the *Original Conſtitution* " *of our Natures*; from that calm but noble *Pleaſure* " that fills the Mind upon the Reflection of good " Actions and rational Conduct; from the *Pain* it " endures when it has forſook the Guidance of Rea- " ſon; from the *Faculties* GOD has given us, and " the *Objects* He has *ſuited* to them; from the *Utili-* " *ty* that *ordinarily* attends a reaſonable and virtuous " Behavior, and that ought to be expected in Futuri- " ty where in *extraordinary* Caſes it is not diſcern'd " at preſent; from the *Attributes* and *Perfections* of " GOD which may be known by the viſible Things " which He has created, and his Method of govern- " ing them; from all theſe we may collect, that to " practiſe Piety and moral Virtue is THE LAW OF " OUR NATURE, and that thus to conform our " Actions to the *Nature and Reaſon of Things*, is to " conform them to THE WILL OF GOD.

BUT this *Law of our Nature* does ſuppoſe *ſocial Life* intended by GOD, according to what has been ſaid, to ſupply Matter and Occaſions for Mens Obedience, by the means of which the *general Divine Laws* and Dictates of Reaſon are *unfolded*, and apply'd in Particulars according to the Circumſtances of Things,

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* *I have tranſcrib'd this from chap.* 3. *of my* Eſſay on Divine Providence and its Symmetry, *which whole Chapter relates to the Subject here briefly touch'd.*

and

and the Purport of publick Laws and Inſtitutions which are not contrary to theſe *prior general Rules.*

IT is true, after all that can be ſaid of *Divine Laws* and of *Human* too, there may be *ſome extraordinary* intricate and perplex'd Caſes, where it may be difficult to diſtinguiſh with perfect Accuracy, what is *Right* and what is *Wrong*; not becauſe there is really *no Difference*, but becauſe the *Thorns* and *Brakes* in an unfrequented Path have in that particular *almoſt cover'd the Boundary*; and ſo, to uſe another Similitude, there is none can doubt but that *there is a Diſtinction of Colours*, although it may be alledg'd, that they may poſſibly be ſo manag'd, and fall ſometimes ſo gradually into one another, that it ſhall not be eaſy to determine, whether ſome particular Point *in the Confines* belong to *this* or to the *other*.

BUT as all Things whatever, ſuch particular difficult Circumſtances Men may ſometimes be ſituated in, as well as the general Imbecillity that adheres to them in their frail mortal State, are *open to the Eyes of Him who is to be our Judge*; and as we are aſſur'd, we have *not a hard Maſter* or *unrighteous* Judge, we may make our ſelves eaſy from theſe Conſiderations even in the moſt *difficult and perplex'd Circumſtances*. In the mean time as to *common and ordinary* Caſes there are very plain Rules, if we would but be ſufficiently attentive to them.

GOD has written plain Characters and Sentiments of Equity upon all our Breaſts, if our Luſts and indulged Paſſions do not deface the fair Impreſſion: He has made an inward Complacency and Satisfaction the inſeparable Companions to a Conſciouſneſs of righteous

Dealing, and He has made Self-condemnation, with Regret and Shame, not only near a Tribunal or in Company, but even in Solitude to attend the Remembrance of Injuries, and of cruel Oppreſſions of our Fellow-creatures. So alſo in regard to Love and Benevolence towards them (which is the Principle and Parent of Beneficence, and of every kind and generous Action) that we ſhould love one another is a Rule and Leſſon which we are taught of GOD, not only by many expreſs Precepts, but GOD has taught it us alſo in that Law written on our Hearts, where Heathens as well as Chriſtians have very amply recogniz'd it. Whoever have ſhewn it in their Practice have without doubt had a wonderful Satisfaction in it; and it is to be hop'd, that a Satisfaction and Pleaſure founded in a Senſe of a Man's having done what Nature and Religion concurrently dictated, of his having anſwer'd the Ends of his being entruſted with uſeful Talents, and imitated the Perfections of his *Creator*, if it be not ſeparable from, is yet no *vitious* or *evil* Effect of *Self-love*, and may deſerve, tho' ſome who pretend to be *Moraliſts* would teach us otherwiſe, a better Name than that of PRIDE.

AN ARISTOTLE, *confus'd* as he was in my humble Opinion and *looſe* in his Notions about the *Origin of Moral Virtue*, yet would not have inſinuated any Thing *ſo very looſe and wild*, ſo groſsly oppoſite to the common Sentiments of Mankind founded upon Truth and Reaſon. But *others* in his Circumſtances have ſpoken of the Truths here aſſerted either more *juſtly*, or at leaſt, and this is what I may venture to ſay with *Confidence*, much more *clearly* and *directly*, than *He* did.

SUCH

SUCH Doctrines as these of the *referring* and *tracing* up of all Goodness to its *great Fountain*, the consequent *Dignity* of Man's Nature, his Capableness of, and Obligations to imitate the DEITY, have been the favourite and the lovely Subjects of the best amongst the antient Philosopers, as well as the most excellent of our modern Divines and Moralists. Many an honest Pagan would have called those ignoble and abject Philosophers, if they might be call'd at all by that Name, who should have look'd upon these Sentiments as the Fictions of Self-love and Pride; and particularly CICERO, who has sometimes bestow'd such kind of Appellations upon those of his Days, whose Principles had greatest Resemblance to these I am opposing. But I wish, that they who charge us with ascribing an imaginary Dignity and Excellence to our Nature, would seriously consider what Dishonour it casts upon the Author of it, to assert or suppose that He has created a numerous Species of rational Creatures, capable of doing such Things as should be approv'd by Him, as should be useful to, and applauded by, all of the Species that are Spectators of them, under the Influence of *Delusion*, but *uncapable* of doing so as soon as ever they should exert their Reason, and understand the *Truth* of Things. And I believe every Man that thinks soberly, and does not bring with him an unaccountably odd and wretched Prejudice, will condemn and exclude a Thought not only *mortifying to himself*, but so unworthy of and *injurious to his* MAKER.

IT appears, I hope, from what has been said, that they who first brought Men into, and whose Care and Labours are employ'd to preserve them happy together

IN COMMUNITIES, are by no means oblig'd to have Recourſe to *Fraud* and *Impoſture* in order to CIVILIZE them, and excite them to *virtuous* and *generous* Actions. It appears, that they have a moſt ſolid Foundation to build upon, that it is with Sincerity and ſtrict Honeſty, as well as with great Advantage to the Community, that they endeavor to preſerve and keep alive in Men, by all proper Methods of *publick Diſcipline*, thoſe Propenſions to worthy and generous Actions, that Piety to GOD and Love and Benevolence towards one another, taught them by natural Reaſon, which yet by a ſtupid Diſuſe and Neglect of the rational Faculties, whether in a barbarous Solitude, or otherwiſe, where *ſocial Virtues* are uncultivated, might in a great meaſure be obliterated, and together with the *ſocial Appetite*, however ſtrongly impreſs'd by Nature, almoſt effac'd by Cuſtom both *unnatural and uncivil*.

THIS is what I have thought neceſſary or proper to be ſaid in this *firſt Advance*, and to prepare the Way, thus in a diſtinct *Proluſion*, to Conſiderations of ſtill *greater Importance*, in as much as they affect us as we are Members not only of a CIVIL SOCIETY, but alſo of the CHURCH OF CHRIST.

FINIS.

MUSEUM BRITANNICUM